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By the year 2000, the U.S. Navy's inventory of air
launched missiles is expected to triple. With the current
impetus to reduce Department of Defense spending, NAVAIR
(Code 418) has focused attention upon the logistics
requirements for air launched missiles and is currently
seeking a more efficient, cost-cutting maintenance strategy.
Presently in the conceptual stage, a Request for Information
(RFI) has been drafted by NAVAIR to be distributed to
interested contractors in an effort to determine the
feasibility of an omnibus maintenance site. This thesis
explores those issues relevant to the RFI and attempts to
provide a non-biased structure from which the responses to
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the end of the Reagan Administration approaches,
fiscal constraints are expected to become increasingly
critical. To effectively man and equip its six-hundred ship
fleet, the Navy must seek ways to reduce outlays and
obligations in every area possible. One of these areas is
the subject of this thesis; the configuration of an
intermediate and depot level maintenance facility for the
Navy's arsenal of air launched missiles.
The decision maker is faced with both near-term and
long-range costs. Will he consider the full life-cycle
costs or will his view be limited to more immediate
concerns? Will he base his projections only on minimizing
the next fiscal year's cost of the project, even though such
a decision will likely result in an ultimately higher life
cycle price tag?
Cost is not the only factor to consider. The decision
maker is also faced with such diverse elements as social and
ecological impact, the current state of local and national
politics and many other facets of the problem which will be
addressed in this thesis.
Tradeoffs exist at every decision point. From an
economic perspective, the decision maker must choose between
the amount of utility he is sacrificing to reduce his costs
by each monetary unit. With regard to DoD effectiveness, it
is extremely difficult to measure utility in the form of
dollars. For example, how does one begin to quantify
deterrence? Can or should it be measured in dollars or is
there another, more appropriate yardstick with which we can
make an optimal decision?
One method of quantifying deterrence is with the use of
readiness. The Navy uses readiness figures for virtually all
of its operational quantification. For missiles, readiness
is computed as follows:
Readiness (%) = Number of RFI missiles
Total missile inventory
where total missile inventory is that number set
by CNO directive, or actual inventory, whichever
is lower. [Ref. 1]
It is assumed the decision maker seeks an optimal
solution. However, he may be forced to sub-optimize at the
component level in order to obtain the best final
product/service or, if he optimizes each component, he may
be left with a sub-optimal system. This concept also
applies in the macro sense. The government may need to sub-
optimize each weapon type in order to optimize the overall
Navy mission requirements.
A. BACKGROUND
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is responsible for
all air launched missiles within the Navy's inventory. This
inventory currently includes: HARM, HARPOON, PHOENIX,
SHRIKE, SIDEWINDER, SPARROW, STANDARD ARM, TOW, and WALLEYE.
As the following systems come "on line", they will be
included with the above: AMRAAM, HELLFIRE, MAVERICK,
PENGUIN, SKIPPER, and SIDEARM. [Ref. 2: p. 1-1-1]
Following the maintenance concept of naval aircraft,
missile maintenance is performed on three separate levels:
organizational, intermediate and depot. Reference 2 imposes
limitations on the extent of maintenance each of these
levels is allowed to perform.
The lowest level of maintenance is the organizational
level or 0-level. This is the maintenance performed by the
individual ship or squadron and is basically limited to the
procedures necessary to maintain the equipment in an
operational status. On missiles, this effort consists
primarily of removing the missile from its container,
conducting a visual inspection, installing the flight
control surfaces and attaching the missile to the aircraft.
No repair work on the missile proper is performed at the 0-
level
.
The next tier is the Intermediate level, or I-level.
Maintenance performed at this level includes inspection and
testing of the All-Up-Round (AUR) to determine its readiness
for issue to the fleet, replacing major sub-assemblies and
very limited work on individual components. As this thesis
is written, all intermediate missile maintenance is
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performed at the Naval Weapons Stations at Concord,
California, Fallbrook, California, Yorktown, Virginia, and
Missile Maintenance Unit I in the Republic of the
Philippines. For the Navy's missile inventory, I-level
maintenance consists of removal and installation of such
items as the guidance control section, warhead or engine
sub-assemblies. Work on these sub-assemblies is not
currently performed at the I-level.
The most complex level of maintenance is the Depot.
Here, the sub-assemblies are inspected, tested and repaired
down to the faulty component. It is at this level that the
decision to rework the part or replace it is made. For
missiles, the Depot does not fully assemble the weapon, but
returns the repaired sections to the Intermediate level. It
is the job of I-level to assemble and test the missile as an
AUR. This level will then issue it to the fleet for use.
The Naval Aviation Depots, or NADEPs (formerly known as
Naval Aircraft Rework Facilities or NARFs) at Alameda and
Norfolk are currently the only organic facilities that
perform missile depot-level maintenance. These facilities
accommodate the Sparrow, Sidewinder, Phoenix, Shrike and
Harm. Depot-level maintenance for the remaining missile
systems is performed by the prime manufacturers at their
facilities located throughout the country.
An additional facility. Missile Maintenance Unit One
(MMU-1), is located at Cubi Point in the Philippines. The
function of MMU-1 is analogous to the weapons stations.
However, MMU-1 is located near the advanced deployed units
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and can screen and repair
fleet returns with greatly reduced transportation costs and
missile down time. A second MMU, to be located in the
Mediterranean, is under study.
Early in 1987, NAVAIR (Code 418) was directed by
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Shipbuilding and
Logistics to study the possibility of combining the
intermediate and depot level maintenance facilities under
one roof, either at a naval installation or at a
contractor's plant. This idea was conceived as a cost
cutting measure by reducing capital investment and as a
means to help reduce turn around time of missiles. In order
to comply with the Competition In Contracting Act, NAVAIR is
considering suggestions from both government contractors and
its organic facilities. At the time of this writing, a
Request For Information has been advertised to allow
interested parties the opportunity to provide inputs to the
decision maker. As currently planned, these participants
may compete under the full and open competition premise of
government procurement.
Mr. Lyle Hochberger, Associate Director of the Weapons
Support Directorate for the Pacific Missile Test Center,
contacted Professor Dan Boger of the Naval Postgraduate
School in the spring of 1987, suggesting several thesis
10
opportunities regarding the missile maintenance concept.
Several students have undertaken different facets of the
problem, our work being one of them.
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION
It has become apparent from the interview process and
the Request For Information that five basic decisions should
be made before the formal Request For Proposal can be
initiated. The decision maker must determine: 1) to what
degree will capital assets be owned by the government, 2) to
what degree will commercial staffing be employed, 3) the
number and location of the proposed sites{s), 4) the degree
to which a common core of test equipment is technologically
and economically feasible and 5) which aspects of the
intermediate/depot level maintenance concept might be
combined to increase efficiency.
Figure 1 is intended to provide a quick grasp of the
numerous alternatives available to the government for the
missile maintenance concept. It has intentionally been
over-simplified for illustrative purposes. In reality, many
choices will likely present numerous intermediate decisions.
For example, the choice between one central test bench
for all missiles and a separate test bench for each missile
type could be expanded to include the choices of two or
three test benches tailored for missiles of similar
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Figure 1. Simplified Depiction of Alternatives
12
included in the model, the number of end alternatives
increases exponentially.
Figure 2 demonstrates a possible means of assigning
costs to each alternative. The amounts have no basis in
reality and are simply intended to show that, with each
alternative, individual component costs will vary. For
instance, the development of a new, multiple missile
maintenance facility will likely incur acquisition and
operating costs much different from those of a single
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Figure 2. Component Costs Per Alternative
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government owned facility and a contractor owned facility
adds another dimension which may affect each cost factor in
differing degrees.
C. SCOPE
The intent of this thesis is not to recommend a
particular facility configuration. It is intended to
qualitatively define the problem confronting the decision
maker and discuss those variables having the greatest impact
upon the solution. Much data currently exists on many of
the variables mentioned throughout this study and the reader
will be directed to appropriate sources of information which
will amplify each point.
D. METHODOLOGY
The thesis research consisted mainly of interviews with
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Code 418, Naval Weapons
Stations, Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Pacific Missile Test
Center ( PMTC ) and civilian contractor personnel. During
these interviews, opinions from various people were gathered
and digested. We have attempted to express the more notable
suggestions of these people within this thesis.
Weapons stations interviews were conducted at NWS
Concord, NWS Yorktown and NWS Seal Beach (Fallbrook). The
NADEPs we visited were at Alameda and Norfolk.
Contractor personnel were interviewed from the McDonnell
Douglas facility in St. Louis, Missouri. This corporation
14
was selected because of its extensive involvement in the
Harpoon weapon system. Not involved in air launched
missiles, but another source of missile information was the
Lockheed missile facility located in Sunnyvale, California.
This plant was selected because it has enjoyed a long
involvement in the Polaris/Poseidon/Trident missile system
and it possesses some similarities with the McDonnell
Douglas plant.
E. PREVIEW
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapters II
through VI address five major decision areas selected
because they appeared to be the most commonly mentioned
elements of the problem during the interview process. We
have attempted to logically present the significant
attributes for the decision maker to consider within these
chapters
.
Chapter II compares and contrasts the major factors
involved with the issue of a government versus a contractor
owned facility.
Chapter III is a follow-on to Chapter II in that it
discusses the facets of a government versus contractor
operated facility.
Chapter IV lists the pros and cons of a single site
versus multiple sites for a repair facility.
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Chapter V presents a discussion of test equipment. In
this chapter, the considerations of using a central, omnibus
test bench or selecting off-the-shelf components to
configure test sets for each missile system are included.
Chapter VI explores potential advantages and pitfalls of
using a combined intermediate/depot level facility.
Chapter VII discusses the initial steps that the
decision maker should take in determining costs for
comparison of alternatives.
In Chapter VIII, a summary is provided of the essential
points of this thesis and conclusions and recommendations
are presented which should help the decision maker arrive at
a more informed choice among available alternatives.
16
II. GOVERNMENT OWNED VS. CONTRACTOR OWNED
The decision that will profoundly affect subsequent
choices is the extent to which the proposed maintenance
facilities and capital will be owned by the government.
From a cost standpoint, the issue shares many elements of a
classical "make or buy" decision. However, considerations
such as military construction time lag or determining
sufficient surge capacity must be taken into account.
Furthermore, the choice is not necessarily restricted to a
totally government owned or all commercial facility. It is
conceivable that land and buildings may be government owned
while each manufacturer maintains and operates or leases his
own test equipment.
A. CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND CONTRACTOR RISK
Any equipment or buildings which are unique to the
maintenance facility will ultimately be funded by the
government since such property will have little benefit in
any other application. In the event that a commercially
owned facility is chosen, the contractor will likely include
these capital costs for the project in his bid.
Furthermore, unless the government is willing to guarantee
that the contractor's costs for such capital will be offset
during the term of the contract, one can expect a risk
17
factor to be included in the bid price. Test equipment
which requires new and undeveloped technology will
substantially compound this risk element. An additional
concern is manufacturing equipment flexible enough to adapt
to differing missile technology.
On the other hand, contractors who currently own test
equipment or can assign under-utilized production related
equipment to maintenance work can offset capital investment
risk proportionately. Additionally, assets that are easily
converted to commercial use or maintain high salvage value
will minimize risk.
B. NEW FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION
Assuming that some degree of new construction will be
required for the prospective maintenance facility ( ies ) , the
following related issues should be addressed.
1. Milcon Time Lag
Due to the DoD funding process, any military
construction will likely suffer a substantial time lag [Ref.
3,4: p. A-6]. Typically, contractors are much less
restrained in this regard in that they can quickly fund high
priority projects through bond/stock issues or long term
borrowing. However, profit motive and risk of contract
termination will not influence the configuration of a
government owned facility.
18
One other method is available to avoid the Milcon time
lag. With this option, the contractor would build the plant
and at the end of the contract period, if advantageous to
the government, ownership could be transferred.
2 . Phased Expansion
A possible means of reducing system life cycle costs
is a strategy of phased expansion. Aggregate missile volume
is planned to triple by 1997 (Figure 3) and as inventories
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Figure 3. Missile Inventory Growth to Year 2000
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For these reasons a large scale facility (or number of
facilities) is ultimately indicated. Numerous factors, such
as unexpired warranties, insufficient or nonexistent
Technical Data Packages (TDPs), etc., suggest that the
transition of all missile systems to the new maintenance
facility ( ies ) at one time is unlikely. Therefore,
construction of a facility that is designed to accommodate
all missile work from day one will likely experience a
lengthy period of under-utilization and opportunity costs
from idle assets. Some increase in initial construction
costs can be expected by designing buildings that are
readily expandable or test benches that can accommodate
future missile systems. Nonetheless, long term system life
cycle costs can be reduced by such measures, provided the
planned workload is actually realized.
3 . Centralized Use of Existing Production Support
Facilities
Installations such as NADEP Alameda or NADEP Norfolk
have various facilities available which can be used to
augment missile maintenance. For example, each site has
existing paint and sheet metal shops used exclusively for
aircraft maintenance. Except for highly specialized
painting procedures (such as those employed for the
Harpoon), economies of scale may be realized through the
1 An opportunity cost is the cost of the next best
alternative to which the given resources can be put. [Ref
24, p. 129]
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expanded, centralized use of these shops. If their use by a
civilian owned facility is contemplated, accounting
procedures for work performed will have to be established.
4 . Non-Production Support Elements
Consideration should be given to support elements
which are not directly related to production. This would
include proximity to firefighting units, security,
transportation systems, etc.. Each of these systems exist
at DoD sites where missile maintenance is currently
conducted.
a. Ordnance Firefighting Capability
Firefighting units at naval air stations and
especially DoD weapons facilities are specifically trained
to handle fires involving ordnance. Since they are already
established, little, if any, additional cost would be
incurred by their expanded role. In contrast, a civilian
plant may be required to establish this capability to meet
insurance and safety requirements.
b. Security
Security at naval air stations and weapons
facilities can be changed as needed. In addition, military
installations are manned and equipped to counter terrorist
activity and larger scale threats.
c. Access to Transportation
Naval air stations and, to a lesser extent,
naval weapons stations can provide immediate access to air
21
transport. Strategically, this may be a crucial feature in
the event that rapid replacement of fired rounds becomes
paramount. Furthermore, naval air stations and naval
weapons stations are generally located adjacent to deep
water ports, thus providing additional logistical
advantages
.
5 . Commercial Management Implications
If the facility ( ies ) is(are) to be contractor
operated under an ongoing competitive bid process,
government ownership of the property will greatly simplify
the turnover of operations between two commercial firms.
Otherwise, reprocurement and transfer of assets to the
assuming contractor must be negotiated each time a change
occurs. If the facility were contractor owned, relocation
to a new site may be required when a new contract is
awarded. The new geographical location of the entire
operation could substantially affect the established work
force, since new employees would need to be hired or, if
workers were retained, they would have to be moved to the
new site. Additionally, new transportation networks must be
developed to provide for proper delivery of material to the
new site.
C. CONCLUSION
Ownership of the maintenance facility is an obvious long
term choice that must be made only after a thorough analysis
22
of the situation has been conducted. In this chapter we
have presented a few of the more important concerns (both
strategic and economic) the decision maker must include in
his analysis. Investment, risk, plant expansion planning,
movement of the facility during contract change and
peripheral support capabilities are some of the topics
discussed.
Chapter III continues this line of thought with the
facets involved in the operation (whether government or
contractor) of the facility ( ies )
.
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III. GOVERNMENT VS. CONTRACTOR OPERATED
Very different from, yet related to, the discussions
presented in Chapter II is the contrast between a government
operated and a civilian operated facility. Several major
differences exist between the two management philosophies of




1 . Tiered or Flat Structure
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the
government and civilian community is the method by which the
organization is structured. In the civil service, the
management hierarchy tends to be vertical, with several
layers between the bottom and the top of the organization.
This system is highly centralized, with the major decision
making authority resting with one, or at most, very few
individuals. Government organizations emphasize conformance
to regulations, not profit. This type of concern, although
capable of keeping tight controls on all operations, may be
slow and bureaucratic when decisions must be made. [Ref. 5:
p. 314]
Many civilian organizations, in the interest of
efficiency and profit, have reduced the number of management
layers, flattening their tier structures, with each manager
24
directing the efforts of a larger number of people. Due to
reduced numbers of management and supervisory personnel
(and, therefore, lower overhead costs), this organizational
makeup can be quite advantageous from a business sense.
Drawbacks, however, include the increased degree of training
and experience that individual workers must possess to be
effective. Since the manager must direct a larger number of
people, he has less time to train and educate the employees
in their individual tasks. Therefore, personnel who possess
the competence to function as managers of large numbers of
workers (floor level personnel) in a flat tiered
organization will naturally command a higher salary.
2 . Bureaucracy and Flexibility
The less bureaucratic nature of many commercial
firms allows them to respond rapidly to a changing
environment or new requirements placed upon the firm. On
the other hand, the DoD organizational structure, whose
makeup typically is highly vertical, tends to be cumbersome,
since many levels of management may become involved in even
trivial decisions.
If changes to a contract are required, the
contractor has the capability to rapidly respond to those
changes. Naturally, he will likely require a contract
modification. This adds administrative costs and delays for
both from the government and the contractor. Very seldom
will a contractor change his process without passing these
25
costs on to the government. On the other hand, if a change
is necessary with a government operated facility, the Navy
has the power to direct the activity to make the change
without immediate concern for contract renegotiation [Ref.
6]. This allows the government to save the costs of
contract modifications, but it also will entail added
administrative burdens.
B. EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
1 . Model Employer
The Civil Service System, although relatively
parallel to its non-government counterparts, is required to
conform to many regulations and procedures not encountered
in private enterprise. The government is considered a
"model employer" and, as such, must hire individuals who
meet minimum qualifications [Ref. 6]. This is not to say
that all civil service personnel are minimally qualified.
However, commercial firms exercise considerably more leeway
when hiring and may hold a position open until the "most
qualified" person applies. Once again, a trade-off is
encountered since this more qualified, and presumably more
productive, worker will require higher wages.
Another disadvantage of DoD hiring policy is the
government's inability to easily terminate less productive
employees. One recent termination case took several months
to settle, requiring many man-days of effort from
26
management; time taken away from production [Ref. 7]. The
hidden costs of lower productivity, increased management
workload and other costs are difficult if not impossible to
quantify, yet they can be substantial. Though a private
company under government contract must also meet certain
criteria prior to letting an unproductive employee go, it is
somewhat less encumbered and can usually respond in a much
more rapid manner than the above cited example suggests.
2 . Pay and Benefits
Although the WG (Wage Grade) pay scale is roughly
2
equal to compensation m the private sector for comparable
positions, the WG system is more structured and less
susceptible to the whims of the economy. Pay raises are
regular, but they usually lag behind those given in private
enterprise. This slower reaction time has its obvious
drawbacks, but these are offset by the greater job stability
attributed to government service. This stability factor
tends to reduce the turnover rates of more stable employers,
the Civil Service system being one of them. However, it is
possible that this job stability would have an inverse
relationship with worker motivation. By this we mean that
as a worker feels more secure in his position, he may
2 The Wage Grade pay system is set by local prevailing union
wage rates. Periodic surveys of the local economy are
conducted and the government's pay of the WG worker is
adjusted based on the results of these surveys.
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experience less incentive to increase his job knowledge
and/or attempt to increase his own productivity.
3 . Union Relations
Strikes are a constant threat in the civilian
economy. Although the ability to strike has numerous
advantages and has often brought constructive changes to the
workplace, this right must be forfeited by the civil service
employee. The government has forbidden any government union
from conducting strikes or honoring the picket lines of any
other striking union.
Since strikes are legal for many non-government
employees (even corporations under government contract), the
threat or actuality of a strike can completely disrupt the
productivity of a facility. This threat to production is a
serious drawback in contracting out vital government
functions. Especially in the missile maintenance field,
unions must be precluded from inhibiting production by means
of striking. Although not commonplace, such a situation
could have a serious impact on the ability of the Navy to
perform its mission by limiting the availability of Ready
For Issue (RFI) missiles, and must be considered when
dealing with contractors.
C. CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
As with any manufacturing operation, production
procedures or techniques are either not always properly
28
documented or performed as documented. Missile maintenance
is no exception. Consider the following true example. A
worker had been performing a certain maintenance function
somewhat differently than that prescribed for a number of
years because the documented procedure was incorrect. It
never occurred to the employee to approach his supervisor
about the deviation from the authorized procedure. When the
person quit, the replacement was not shown the procedure and
his knowledge left with him. When the new worker eventually
performed the operation in the prescribed fashion, a batch
of the parts failed to pass the quality control inspection.
[Ref. 8] This loss of corporate knowledge was extremely
expensive.
The situation just described has occurred time and again
in industry. This brings home the point that it is
extremely difficult to ensure standardized procedures are
absolutely correct or are being fully complied with.
Management must be keenly aware of all procedures
conducted by its employees and confirm these procedures are
proper. If not, the manager should investigate and either
change the employee's methods or change the prescribed
procedure, whichever is more advantageous to the quality of
the final product.
1. Proprietary Information
Difficulties arise when organic entities interface
with commercial activities or a new contractor assumes the
29
maintenance operation. These include patent, copyright and
certain other protections afforded to the designer of a
product or process. Especially regarding depot level
maintenance, the original missile manufacturer may be
extremely reluctant to provide other potential competitors
with data rights that are necessary for repair work.
Although acquisition of proprietary information is possible,
there are, inevitably, costs involved to the government.
"Even when a contractor agrees to unlimited data rights,
securing and maintaining such data can involve substantial
resources (costs to the government)." [Ref. 9: p. 5-19]
2 . TDP Accuracy and Comprehensiveness
One method the military has used to increase
flexibility in contracting, secure proprietary information
and ensure corporate knowledge is retained is through the
use of Technical Data Packages (TDPs). TDPs are a method of
securing either limited or unlimited data rights from the
contractor and are used extensively by the government. In
many cases, they work very well. However, if they are
inadequate, as in the example above, and the government
changes contractors, the new contractor will perform to the
improper TDP with cost producing results [Ref. 9: p. 5-19].
The government then must rely upon reverse engineering to
isolate and correct the problem(s) with the original TDP.
If the government decides to contract out its
missile maintenance, it must be certain that all TDPs are
30
correct and complete. With a DoD facility, TDP problems do
not normally occur since proprietary information is not an
issue. For more information about data rights applicability
and criteria, consult the Defense Acquisition Regulations
(Section 9-202. 2[F] )
.
3 . First Producer Advantage (Learning Curve)
The original manufacturer of a missile system will
naturally possess an extensive depth of knowledge about his
product. His learning curve has "leveled off" and,
therefore, initial associated costs are well below what a
3
competitor could offer [Ref. 10: p. 17]. With a change of
contractor, the costs of a new vendor's steeper learning
curve will ultimately be absorbed by the government, both in
higher unit cost and, possibly, in an increased failure
Rate. These costs can be extensive and must be considered.
D. SUPPLY SUPPORT
Supply support ramifications for a contracted missile
maintenance facility are extensive and are covered in depth
in a thesis written concurrently with this one by Lcdr. John
Ripperton, USN. However, we will address a few of the more
significant concerns obtained during our interviews.
1. Supply Priorities
The Navy's supply system is enormous and that
portion supporting air launched missiles is relatively
3 This situation is also true for the first vendor of a
maintenance contract.
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minuscule. This coupled with the fact that a number of
commands (i.e., NADEPs belong to NAVAIR and are supported by
the Aviation Supply Office or ASO; I-level maintenance
belongs to NAVSEA and is supported by the Spare Parts
Control Center or SPCC) are responsible for the success of
air launched missile maintenance tends to reduce the
priority given to the supply support effort. [Ref. 11] As a
result, maintaining an adequate supply of spares or
providing a timely reaction to urgent requisitions from
various Navy facilities is a continuing problem and could be
extremely expensive if unavailability of spare parts
impinged upon a civilian contractor's operation.
2. Tailored Supply Support
The source of difficulty mentioned above has been
addressed by McDonnell Douglas, which has developed a
separate supply system for its depot level maintenance of
the Harpoon. The company developed a model called "Depot
Stock Allowance List" (DSAL), which is a spares management
system that identifies and calculates spares requirements
for the Harpoon depot facility at the McDonnell Douglas St.
Louis, Missouri plant [Ref. 12]. Such a system is dedicated
to serving only one "customer" and, as such, can respond
rapidly to changes in demand from that customer and the
order does not get "lost in the shuffle", a phenomenon
experienced frequently with organic facilities maintenance.
[Ref. 13]
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Although this tailored system is extremely efficient
and attractive, such a supply support concept carries a
price tag [Ref. 14]. Again, the decision maker must choose
between a highly effective arrangement at a premium price
and the existing system; more cumbersome, but at a far lower
cost .
E. CONTRACT TYPE
If the Navy decides to conduct its missile maintenance
on a commercial basis, contracting considerations will be
crucial. Although normally handled by the contracting
officer, all decision makers must be aware of the benefits
and drawbacks associated with each choice that the
contracting officer makes.
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 established
current government policy which is to migrate toward a cost
type contract for a fixed price contract as quickly as
possible, usually prior to the Milestone II decision
(authority to proceed to the Full Scale Engineering
Development phase) for new start systems [Ref. 15: p. 1].
Assuming this approach is germane to the missile maintenance
facility, the decision maker should consider a fixed price
contract from the start. Except for radically new test
equipment, very little research and development would be
4 If, however, government furnished spare parts cause work
interruptions, delay costs levied by the contractor can be
extensive.
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involved, allowing for a fixed price contract which would




Omnibus or Individual Contract
One question that arises is whether to let a single
contract for all missile maintenance, or to award each
missile type/group as a separate contract. The omnibus
concept could allow the government to realize greater cost
savings in overhead and perhaps in production costs, due to
the realization of economies of scale, whereby outputs
increase faster than inputs, decreasing unit cost. However,
the potential major disruption to the system caused by a
contractor change (resulting from a new contract award)




The term of the contract is another important
determination. Typically, for reasons of reduced risk and
better planning opportunities for the contractor, longer
contracting periods tend to lower the overall cost .
However, the government must live with the contract, good or
bad, for its duration, except in the case of clear evidence
of nonperformance (termination for default). Termination
for the convenience of the government is a possible
5 This can be seen by examining investment, start-up, shut-
down and learning curve costs, all of which occur only once
during the life of the contract.
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alternative; however, it is extremely expensive and subject
to limitations .
a. Get-Out Clause
For some very long term contracts, the
government has incorporated a "get-out" clause. This
provides for periodic reviews of the contract, and at these
times, either party has the option to discontinue the
agreement. This allows flexibility to the government to
terminate a contract that costs more than is deemed
necessary. A good example is a long term contract for
computers. As technology improves, more powerful machines
are available at far lower prices. With the get-out clause,
the government is able to stop the buy of outdated or soon
to be obsolete equipment when new and less expensive, state
of the art merchandise becomes available.
b. Modifications
Closely related to, but not as drastic as a get-
out clause, is contract modification to adjust for changes
in technology, such as the example listed above. As always,
these options cost the government money. Although
modifications and get-out clauses may not be too critical
for a service contract such as missile maintenance, they
6 These limitations are: the government must deal in good
faith, there must be a change in the circumstances of the
contract, and the termination must not be contrary to
paramount government po" icy.
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When considering a new firm for the services of
missile maintenance, the decision maker should be aware of
the extended time period necessary to implement a new
contract. Not only is the bidding process itself extensive,
the time required for the new contractor to "spool up" can
exceed several months with an adverse affect on readiness.
[Ref. 16]
Additionally, if government furnished equipment must
be moved, excessive time and labor will be necessary to
complete the transference of test material. In some cases,
the tear down, movement, set up and check out of test




Possibly one of the more difficult facets to
quantify is the set of standards the government will choose
by which to measure the performance and effectiveness of the
contractor. Two of the biggest cost elements found in any
measurement procedure are the following:
a. Burden of Proof
The choice must be made as to who will assume
the burden of proving performance. Called Alpha or Beta
decision error (consumer or producer risk), statistical
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sampling can contain subtle differences that may equate to
substantial performance variations,
b. Sample Size
Statistically, the larger the sample size, the
closer the sample approximates the population. However,
sampling costs increase dramatically with the sample size,
especially when the test results in the destruction of the
sampled items.
5 . Incentives
Several methods of providing contractors with
incentives to reduce costs, remain on the leading edge of
technology and increase quality are currently employed by
contracting officers. Such methods include savings sharing,
direct reimbursement for beneficial suggestions, or other
means to reward the contractor for improvements in his
product and are usually written into the contract as either
incentives or awards. Many of these could be used in a
missile maintenance contract. For example, instead of the
contractor replacing a part after it has been reworked only
once or a few times, make it more attractive for him to
continue to rework the part as long as it is economical,
while still maintaining the quality required. This can
become a difficult problem since most contractors make a
tidy profit on replacement parts and have little, if any
incentive to be conservative with reusing worn components.
[Ref. 6]
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The government can most assuredly gain by providing
the contractor incentives to stay on top of technology.
Costs can be reduced by employing new procedures or new
materials used in the fulfillment of contract requirements.
Usage of the various existing incentive or award fee
contracts, or the development of a highly tailored method
would greatly benefit the government in reduced life cycle
costs
.
6 . Competition and Second Sourcing
The Spending Reduction Act of 1984, commonly known
as the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (HR 4190)
requires/ among other things, that the government engage in
full and open competition whenever it contracts for goods or
services. This means the government must compete rather
then single source its commercial business. Missile
maintenance is no exception. The decision maker should be
aware of the options open to him when attempting to comply
with these laws
.
At some point, the original contract will expire and
the contracting officer must secure another contract to
continue operation. Assuming other contractors are
interested, they should not be penalized for lack of
experience with the work dictated in the contract. Nor
should the government be limited to one contractor because
7 An excellent source for many of the contracting options
available is Reference 9.
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he is the only one who can perform the tasks. To alleviate
these problems, the following second sourcing methods should
be considered.
a. Leader-Follower
This contract ensures two suppliers. The
contractor with the lowest bid is awarded the majority of
the work, say 70 percent. The next lowest bidder is
apportioned the remainder of the job, in this case 30
percent. Such a system provides the government two
benefits. One advantage is that it ensures two contractors
are kept up to date with production and therefore enjoy
relatively low learning curve costs. Secondly, it provides
the government with a wider industrial base and greater
surge capacity, should the need arise for immediate
production increases.
b. Contractor Teams
With this method, two or more contractors are
required to form a team in the development of a project. As
the acquisition process continues, the teams are allowed to
split and compete with each other, evolving into a system
such as the leader-follower described above. This idea
might be adapted and a hybrid developed that would serve the
government well in the missile maintenance arena.
c. Technical Data Package (TDP)
Discussed earlier in this section, this system
requires the contractor to prepare and maintain a data
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package that is technically all inclusive and will enable
other responsible contractors to perform the job. Although
an excellent idea, some TDPs have been plagued with flaws
that make the product unacceptable. Since most follow-on
contractors are required to perform to the TDP, the
government must bear the cost to correct the incomplete TDP
(unlike the original contractor, who was required to deliver
an acceptable product).
7 . Quality Control
To ensure a high degree of quality control, the
government has developed several formal quality standards to
which the contractor must conform. Among these are MIL-I-
45208 and MIL-Q-9858 . Naturally, as quality control
requirements become more stringent, the cost of the product
increases. The decision maker must make a choice in how
much quality, and at what price, he will be willing to
accept
.
If maintenance is to be contracted out, quality
control confirmation will be performed by either the Defense
Contract Auditing Service ( DCAS ) or a military Plant
Representative Officer (PRO). Consideration should be made
for the additional expense this will incur for government
administration of the quality program. These costs would
8 These are not necessarily applicable to missile
maintenance, but are mentioned merely as examples of
standards available.
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not be incurred if an organic facility was employed since
DCAS or PRO personnel are unnecessary at DoD establishments.
8
.
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)
Ultimately, the government pays for virtually all of
the equipment used in its commercial contracts. One
advantage of GFE is that the face price of the contract is
reduced. This cost savings can be offset, however, by the
fact that the government tends to keep and attempt to use
obsolete equipment, sacrificing performance and increasing
maintenance costs. Old, obsolete equipment should be
considered a sunk cost when considering the life cycle cost
of missile maintenance contracting. Additionally, delays in
delivery of GFE to the contractor can lead to extensive cost
overruns
.
9. Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
Life cycle cost should be the bottom line for any
acquisition. This is not limited to goods but extends to
services as well. For a service, however, the LCC factor
should be apparent early in the acquisition process; ideally
during the request for proposal phase in negotiations.
a. Supportability
LCC takes into account virtually every subject
mentioned in this thesis, and includes, but is not limited
to, the design aspects of Pre-Planned Product Improvement
(P I), reliability, maintainability availability and
supportability. The first four factors are dealt with in
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the product's design phase, but supportability is dealt with
extensively in the maintenance of the system.
Supportability deals with the capability of the logistics
function to maintain a steady supply of parts and services
to the provider of maintenance. Supportability is strongly
influenced by both the system's maintainability and
reliability factors. [Ref. 18]
3
b. Pre-planned Product Improvement (P I)
Mentioned in the prior paragraph, P I is
normally a design concept and not usually dealt with in the
logistics or maintenance arenas. However, the concept has
some interesting dimensions that could be adapted to several
aspects of missile maintenance, including test equipment and
facilities. P I could be employed when considering what
test equipment to buy, how facilities will be constructed,
and so on. With proper planning, the life cycle cost of the
system could be reduced by the employment of a modified P I
program.
10. Workload
Three ways of addressing workload are Basic Ordering
Agreements, Indefinite Quantity Contracts and Requirements
Contracts. Each of these give the contracting officer
flexibility in determining the amount of work the contractor
is required to perform. For example, if an Indefinite
Quantity Contract was used, the government has the
flexibility to change, at any time, the amount of work it
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wishes the contractor to perform. This is beneficial to the
government in that it doesn't have to pay for idle time, but
it places a burden upon the contractor; he must try to
determine how much work will come to him and hire
appropriately. Naturally, the contractor will charge a
premium for the assumption of such a risk.
Since the maintenance contract may assume many
different forms, including the three just mentioned, the
Administrative Contract Officer should make every effort to
9
utilize all options available to him .
F. PRODUCTION PLANNING
If a contract is let for missile maintenance, the
question of how to perform the task will most likely be left
up to the contractor. However, the decision maker should be
aware of some major factors involved with production
planning so that he might isolate any unnecessary costs or
recommend alternative methods which would increase
efficiency and reduce the costs involved.
Since cost is a primary factor of most contracts, we
are, in effect, setting a limit to the amount of readiness
we will attain. In today's environment, we must look for
the maximum amount of readiness per dollar available to us.
Good production planning can help increase that ratio.
9 These three methods, among others, are discussed in detail
in Chapter 3 of Contract Administration , Vol.1, School of




The amount of stock readily available to the
production department is one of the biggest concerns of the
production manager. "Inventory policies are important
enough that operations, marketing and financial managers
work together to reach agreement on these policies at the
highest levels in many corporations" [Ref. 19: p. 443]. If
supplies run out, the production line is shut down.
Not only must the actual value of the inventory be
considered, but also the additional ordering, transportation
and holding costs associated with that stock. The two
concepts discussed below, Just-In-Time and Materials
Requirements Planning, are proven methods in reducing
inventory costs.
a. Just-In-Time
To minimize inventory costs, the Japanese have
developed a system called Kan-Ban or Just-In-Time (JIT).
Under this system, little or no inventory is held by the
manufacturer. Rather, the suppliers make frequent (up to
several times per day) deliveries of stock, ensuring
continuous production without incurring any inventory [Ref.
20: pp. 130-133]. Timing is critical and suppliers must be
reliable for the system to properly function.
b. Materials Requirements Planning
Similar to JIT is Materials Requirements
Planning (MRP). MRP is a computer-based system that breaks
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down the master production schedule into its elements of raw
materials, parts, subassemblies and assemblies needed during
a given time interval, determines which materials are in
stock or on order, and develops a schedule of orders which
will fill the demand during the planning period [Ref. 19: p.
510]. With this concept, all costs are considered and
inventory orders are placed in economic order quantities.
Each time an order is placed, the quantity requested is such
that the aggregate cost of the inventory is minimized.
2. Labor
One of the more interesting concepts to improve both
production and worker interest which may be adaptable to
missile maintenance is known as Group Technology [Ref. 21:
p. 200]
.
Group technology places workers in teams that
perform the entire operation instead of each individual
performing one specific task (such as those found in
assembly lines). This method allows the worker to see the
entire job, from start to finish. In addition to gaining an
appreciation for the total work process, he becomes cross-
trained in several areas, increasing his flexibility and
interest in his job.
7 Aggregate cost includes all ordering, transportation,
holding, stockout and inventory costs associated with the
product. [Ref. 20: p. 143]
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3 . Layout
A properly configured production facility will
greatly increase plant efficiency. Ideally, the building
will have been designed and constructed with missile
maintenance in mind. This will allow design and production
engineers to most efficiently plan for production and
eventual expansion of the facility, if, as mentioned
earlier, an omnibus contract is not initially let.
An integral part of plant layout is where equipment
will be placed within the building. Operations Sequence
Analysis is an effective tool for accomplishing this task
[Ref. 19: p. 340]. The end product of this analysis is an
orderly, efficient flow of the product through the entire
maintenance function.
G. ACCOUNTING
A major stumbling block in the organic-commercial
comparison path is found in the different accounting
procedures employed by government entities and commercial
contractors. A letter by Dean Merritt of NADEP Alameda
stated:
Cost Accounting practices vary widely between
NAVAIREWORKFACs and private contractors. Differences
range from fundamentals, such as the definitions of what
is direct or indirect to such subtleties as spreading
utility costs equally to each direct hour vice making work
in machine intensive areas absorb a more realistic share
of costs. Additionally, rates for utilities, material and
services provided by other Navy activities may not reflect
actual cost but are reported by the NAVAIREWORKFACs as
actual costs. Cost accounting practices may represent the
46
most challenging area to deal with in that the budget
cycle cannot be adjusted until the year after the budget
year. [Ref. 22: p. 2]
Each organization uses a different method of accounting.
Although these diverse procedures can be made commensurate,
extreme care must be taken when equating the two. The
decision maker should know by what means the differences




Deliberate underbidding is, unfortunately, a reality and
the opportunity to indulge in it exists for both a
government facility and the government contractor. The
importance of maintaining an equitable bidding arena (by
levying penalties on those who deliberately underbid) for
both parties is emphasized. Although an absolutely fair
environment is unlikely, the current competition process
should eliminate, to the greatest extent possible, any
advantage enjoyed by either party.
I. CONCLUSION
The length of this chapter tends to indicate the
relative significance of the commercial vs. DoD management
question. Prices of hardware, buildings and land may be
relatively even between the two. Contracting to the best
advantage of the government while being fair to the
contractor will reap substantial benefits in the long run.
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The awarding and management of the contract as well as the
other resources mentioned in this chapter will have far
reaching effects, both economically and strategically.
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IV. MULTIPLE SITES VS. SINGLE SITE
The choice between a single and multiple site facility
will have strategic, logistical, and economic implications.
If more than one site is considered, the complexity of the
decision increases because an attempt to determine both the
ideal locations and optimal number should be made.
Additionally, multiple site facilities can take on a number
of configurations. A particular site may process missiles
that share similar test procedures and equipment or the
sites may be defined according to the size of individual
weapon inventories. A large inventory missile system may
consume a single plant's workload whereas another facility
might handle several weapon types with smaller inventories.
A. STRATEGIC CONCERNS
An obvious concern regarding a single site facility is
that of strategic risk. If the majority of the weapons in
the repair pipeline are concentrated at a single point, they
become much more susceptible to sabotage or a well placed
nuclear strike. Listed below are a number of suggestions to
reduce the risk to a single site facility.
(1) Locate the facility centrally in CONUS. This would
increase the time available for U.S. defense systems
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to react and would decrease the accuracy of enemy
targeting.
(2) Incorporate nuclear hardening in the facilities
construction. This, of course, will substantially
increase the costs of the facility.
(3) Maintain high security to counter sabotage.
(4) Disperse inventory points where queues develop. For
example, missiles awaiting inspection and those that
have been reworked might be stored in different
geographic locations. This option, however, will
complicate the management aspects of missile
transportation and increase transportation costs.
B. TRANSPORTATION CONCERNS
The number of different sites and types of missiles
processed at each site will greatly impact the
transportation requirements for the maintenance system.
Options range from a single site located in the central
continental United States, where transportation routes
radiate out to customers and back in, to that of a multiple
site system where routes form a complex network of nodes and
arcs .
1 . Transportation Complexity
Depending upon the configuration of each facility,
the multiple site concept will entail varying degrees of
complexity in the routing system for missile transportation.
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For example, if Naval Weapons Station Yorktown processed all
types of missiles, units coming from and going to aircraft
carriers based out of Norfolk would travel minimal distances
to and from the rework site and require greatly reduced
handling. However, if certain missiles were processed only
at Fallbrook or Concord, California, as is the case with the
Harpoon's I level maintenance, travel requirements are
significantly increased. When requirements are added for
carriers based in Mayport, Florida, Alameda and San Diego,
California, and ten different missile types are involved,
the complexity drastically increases.
With the use of computers, transportation routing
problems that once took days to solve by hand can now be
completed in minutes [Ref. 19: pp. 255-266]. Thus,
optimizing the transportation network for missiles is not
limited by complexity. However, the actual management of a
highly complex network can produce added costs. As
complexity in the network increases, so does the opportunity
for missed shipments, breakdowns and complications due to
weather. Furthermore, increased damage due to mishandling
can be expected.
2. Proximity to Ship Offload Site
The location(s) of the facility ( ies ) affect the
optimal choices in transportation modes and materials
handling equipment. Proximity to a deep water port will
offer the advantage of immediate offload (possibly by gantry
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crane) from an ordnance carrying ship with direct
transportation to the maintenance plant via truck, rail or
other methods. Since the weapons will be transported
straight to the maintenance facility, handling requirements
will be reduced. Weapons Stations Concord and Yorktown and
Naval Air Stations Alameda and Norfolk have such advantages.
Additionally, they possess the secondary service of
currently available rail systems. This asset offers the
advantage of alternative modes of transportation. If,
however, the facility is located away from a deep water
port, the missile may be transported by several modes and
carriers within each mode to the appropriate site. This
increases the likelihood of damage during overland travel
and adds to the probability of damage from increased




Plant locations that require shipments by truck will
incur increased freight costs, transport time and possible
increased damage from the extra handling and movement on the
roadways [Ref. 20: p. 274], Additionally, Department of
Transportation and union regulations impose limitations
regarding the number of missiles per truckload, routes,
security, etc. [Ref. 3].
4 Shipping Container Requirements
The multiple site concept will increase accounting
and coordination requirements for support equipment such as
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shipping containers. Each missile type uses shipping
containers specific to that weapon system. Though it is not
typically considered an integral part of a weapon, the
container that holds the all-up-round or component is
absolutely necessary for shipment and storage.
Presently, containers do not remain at the repair
facility while the missile is reworked or processed. Some
containers are partially loaded with finished missiles and
shipped to a user that requires less than a full container.
Others will be sent back to the manufacturer to accommodate
new production. Still others permanently exit the container
inventory when used to ship weapons that have been sold to
foreign governments
.
Unnecessary delays will occur if the number of
containers at a given site is insufficient to hold the
number of outgoing missiles or components. Therefore, an
accounting system is required for the containers which will
become more complex as the number of sites increases.
5 . Transport Distance Reduction and Multiple Sites
Since roughly 80% of the missiles due for periodic
inspection pass on the initial checkout at the I level
facilities, it could be advantageous to maintain I level
sites close to where the missiles are offloaded from the
fleet [Ref. 23]. For example, if the Serviceable-In-Service
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Time (SIST) has expired on a missile that is offloaded in
Norfolk, it need not be transported across the country to
Weapons Station Concord if the Yorktown facility were
capable of recertifying and returning the weapon to the
fleet. This would reduce transportation costs and the
associated time. Higher readiness figures result since the
missile would not waste time in a queue or on a truck, but
would be quickly returned to RFI condition.
An even more dramatic savings of this nature is
realized through the use of Missile Maintenance Units (MMUs)
located in the Philippines and, prospectively, the
Mediterranean. The MMU located in the Philippines can
recertify a missile without the need for transporting it
over 5000 miles back to CONUS . A similar facility whose
establishment is proposed for the Mediterranean would also
provide this advantage in an area where increased U.S. Navy
operations has heightened AUR demand.
6 . Availability of Test Equipment at a Single Site
Maintainability and reliability of test equipment
becomes more critical as the number of proposed sites
decreases. If the test and repair workload per site is
increased, the impact of equipment down time will affect a
greater number of missiles and, therefore, overall mission
11 Serviceable-in-Service Time is the period of time between
maintenance inspections. Expiration of this period requires
that the missile be inspected and recertified at an I level
facility before it is reissued for fleet use.
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readiness. However, from a cost standpoint, it may be less
expensive to pay for increased availability in test
equipment by increasing the number of test equipment spares
inventory at one site rather than maintain individual
equipment, and limited spares inventories at numerous
locations. [Ref. 18: pp. 55-56]
C. ECONOMIES OF SCALE
The most obvious economic effect of locating a
centralized facility at a single site is the economies of
scale that may be realized. Spare parts can be maintained
at a single location. Administrative and personnel services
can be conducted from single offices and land and
construction costs can be minimized. However, as Quade
[Ref. 24] points out, beyond a certain point, most systems
become so complex that inefficiencies due to crowding,
mishandled communications, reduced flexibility, etc.
outweigh the benefits. Therefore, determination of an
optimal size is indicated.
1. Test Equipment Acquisition Costs
As mentioned above, acquisition of a single
maintenance site could eliminate the requirement for a large
number of missile test benches which would be necessary to
support multiple facilities. However, reliability and
maintainability issues suggest multiple spares even if only
one test bench is maintained for each missile system at a
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single site. If the decision is made to keep a single test
bench per missile system, then the cost of acquiring
equipment for facilities that handled only one missile type
would be essentially the same as that for a single facility
that handled all missile types. The real expense will be





Tradeoffs exist regarding the manner in which
information is processed. For example, multiple sites will
require a more extensive means for tying into existing
reporting systems, i.e.. Computer Assisted Inventory
Management System (CAIMS), while a single site may require
only one terminal [Ref. 25]. However, a large, single site
facility can be expected to incur higher costs for internal
reporting.
3 Facilities Construction
One large facility can reduce the cost of land and
buildings on a per missile basis. To illustrate this point,
consider the simple construction of a storage area for
incoming missiles. Two separate storage lots will require
two aisles for materials handling equipment whereas a
larger, single lot requires one. The requirements for
miscellaneous necessities such as lounge areas and





Generally, utilities such as electricity and water
can be obtained at lower rates for high use customers.
Savings can also be realized through the reduced need for
utilities related equipment such as power lines and
plumbing.
5 Site Maintenance
Any site that is selected will require scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance [Ref. 18: pp. 810-821]. Janitorial
services, landscaping, painting, etc., must be considered in
the overhead. Vendors performing such services can




Strategic concerns and economies of scale may, at times,
oppose one another. The resultant trade-off choices are
difficult, but with thorough analysis, the decision maker
can select the option that would be the most advantageous to
the government and the taxpayer.
Due to their importance, integrated logistics support
concerns have received the most emphasis in this chapter.
Logistics support has proven to be a significant factor in
the acquisition's life-cycle cost. By investing in a solid
logistics framework, the decision maker can ensure maximum
productivity at minimum cost.
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V. SINGLE TEST BENCH VS. MULTIPLE TEST BENCH
The decision to acquire a single, "one test unit does
all" facility or maintain the current separate test bench
per missile type concept requires a careful analysis of the
technology involved. A single test bench that accommodates
all missile types will likely require a costly engineering
effort. On the other hand, potential exists for savings in
such areas as personnel reduction and test equipment life-
cycle costs. However, consideration should not be
restricted to the present value savings of a single bench's
life cycle costs. One must also analyze the risks
associated with hardware and software obsolescence in an
environment where third and fourth generation systems come
and go within the span of a decade.
A. SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS
Presently, each missile system depends to some degree
upon software for its testing process. If the multiple test
bench concept is retained, it is envisioned that this
software will continue to be used and updated as required.
From a software standpoint, maintaining this status quo is
obviously the least expensive route.
However, when considering a single unit system, several
alternatives exist for the development of software. Each
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has advantages and disadvantages whose impact will vary
depending upon the hardware configuration.
1. Use Existing Software
One possibility is to develop the hardware around
software which is currently in use. Since, in the past five
years, the trend in the hardware to software cost ratio has
changed dramatically from a ratio of 7:1 to a current ratio
of 1:9, this could result in significantly minimizing
software development costs [Ref. 26]. Secondly, current
software is a known product; operational delays due to
prototype debugging would be avoided. Thirdly, operator
retraining would be minimized if the manipulation of the new
hardware is similar to that of the old.
The disadvantage is that the use of state-of-the-art





Design New Hardware/Software System
Another option would be to produce a completely new
hardware/software system. This would facilitate the use of
12
emergent technology as well as the opportunity to design
in production efficiency. For example, with the recent
advances in microprocessor speeds, the time required for
some test procedures might be reduced by hours. Or, the
12 Fourth generation software is a prime example. Briefly,
it allows the use of natural language syntax for writing
queries and programming solutions, better enabling less
experienced people direct interface with the computer. [Ref.
27: p. 204]
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process of trouble shooting at the depot level might be
simplified by developing "artificially intelligent" expert
systems. [Ref. 27: p. 376]
The obvious disadvantage of this approach is the
cost in money and time. The software engineer must
understand the expert's heuristic reasoning process before
he can develop a functional algorithm. Furthermore, the end
product must be suited to the non-expert. Regardless of how
much the operation can be simplified, a certain degree of
operator retraining would be required whenever the hardware
changes
.
3 . Software Update Capability
Savings may be realized if the software for a new
test system is designed to be easily updated. The
development of a missile system usually continues through
the production phase. From the viewpoint of test equipment
software, the missiles in the initial production run may be
quite different from later versions. Test equipment
software should therefore be engineered in such a way that
physical changes to the missile system will not render the
test software useless. Considering a hypothetical example,
the software menu for the Sparrow test might read:
<<< Choose missile type to be tested:>>>
*** A=Sparrow variant 1
*** B=Sparrow variant 2
*** C=Sparrow variant 3
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If the software is written with individual subroutines for
each variant, the addition of a fourth variant would be
relatively easy and inexpensive. Otherwise, if the
algorithm does not employ subroutines, the program must be
totally rewritten and will incur additional costs.
Two examples of missiles that have varied are the
Sparrow, which underwent a significant transition to solid
state components and the Harpoon, which has experienced
hundreds of Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) [Ref. 12,
14]. Though not all changes can be anticipated or are
relevant to the testing software, flexibility in the
software construction should be maximized.
The same concept holds true for test equipment
hardware, although software tends to be much more sensitive
to seemingly minor changes.
B. HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS
1. Reliability and System Capability
Of particular importance to the single test unit
concept is the need for high reliability in the test
equipment to maintain system capability. Obviously, if a
greater percentage of missiles are processed by one test
bench, a greater amount of production is halted when the
bench fails. Furthermore, a single test unit would, by
necessity, be extremely complex and opportunities for the
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failure of a system increase exponentially as its complexity
increases
.
A number of factors contribute to equipment
reliability such as component redundancy, quality control of
parts, etc., and increases in any factor will boost the cost
of the system. [Ref. 18: App. A] The following measures to
increase system reliability should be considered:
a. Redundancy
The use of parallel circuitry and standby
components would enhance the system reliability. Using two
power supplies at the same time, each capable of carrying
the load by itself, would be an example of a parallel
increase in reliability. The increase could be
quantitatively measured, assuming exponential failure rates,
as follows [Ref. 18: p. 30]:
R^(t) = 1 - [(1 - R^(t)) X (1 - R2(t))],
where R.(t) = reliability (over time t) of component.
or the system, >
.
^ (s)
One central processor could conceivably handle
the requirements of the test unit. However, a second
standby CPU could be used as a backup. The following
formula would be appropriate for measuring increases in
standby reliability. Again assuming exponential failure
rates:
R (t) = R,(t) + R.(t) X (d/MTTF^) X t),
S 1 2 I




Of course, while increasing reliability and
thereby reducing maintenance requirements, either strategy
will increase the acquisition cost of the test unit.
However, this cost may be offset by the reduced need for
spare parts inventories for test equipment and fewer
production delays will be experienced due to test equipment
failure.
b. Compartmentalization
By default, the multiple test bench
configuration is compartmentalized. The failure of one test
unit, while reducing the overall capability of the system,
does not prevent another from functioning. However, this is
not necessarily the case when considering a centralized
unit. For example, the entire system might rely upon one
power supply to serve all of its electronic components.
If this were a high failure rate item, a redundant standby
power supply could be incorporated as illustrated above.
However, another option is to design the system such that
smaller, less expensive power supplies are used for each
missile type. This differs from the system's parallel
redundancy in that the system capability is affected rather
than system reliability if a power supply fails. Obviously,
the system unit could be compartmentalized to such an extent
that it would, in fact, be a multiple test bench.
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c. Procurement Specifications
Reliability can also be increased by raising the
engineering specifications in the contract for the
equipment. Specifications such as mean-time-between-failure
of components, raw material composition or other measures of
quality would apply. This would have the effect of
increasing R, and R„ in the reliability equations shown
above and would result in increased system reliability. Any
such increases in engineering, material, testing and quality
control requirements would substantially increase hardware
and spare parts costs.
d. Excess Capacity
The equipment might be designed such that its
capacity for test and repair of missiles exceeds normal
requirements. In the event that the system fails, the
inventory of Ready for Issue (RFI) missiles would be used as
a buffer. Once the higher capacity system was again
operating, the system would more quickly restore the RFI
inventory. An additional benefit of excess capacity is the
increased surge capability of the facility.
This option carries the costs of the necessary
added inventory as well as its acquisition cost.
2. Of f-The-Shelf vs. Custom Equipment
The decision-maker might consider the degree to
which he can use standard components in the system's design.
Existing generic subsystems are much less expensive than
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developing and purchasing small numbers of highly
specialized pieces of equipment. For instance, if the test
set for each missile type utilized an ordinary micro-
computer to process test data, two elements of reliability
would be positively affected. First, the system would not
necessarily rely upon one complex computer for operation,
and secondly, the availability and interchangeability of
computers is increased. In addition, logistics support of
off-the-shelf items is better than the support found in
specialized material.
A potential drawback to this concept is that of
integrating the standard equipment into the test system.
Though the micro-computer in the above example would be
quite versatile for home and business use, the missile test
system might well require highly specialized components and
the process of configuring standard equipment to do the job
could prove more expensive.
3 . Processing Capability
The decision to design a centralized test bench such
that all missile types can be processed simultaneously or
one at a time will present cost tradeoffs.
One possibility is to produce a unit with a central,
highly versatile processor and peripheral stations where
each missile type would be connected. This would be
analogous to a mainframe computer with multiple terminals
that operate on a timeshare basis. An advantage to this
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concept is that it eliminates the need to setup and tear
down the equipment when different missile types are to be
processed. Additionally, if a large influx of a certain
missile type occurs, other missile types need not wait for
processing.
This concept may entail greater costs for several
reasons. Each peripheral station will be occupying space
whether it is in use or not. Furthermore, materials
handling equipment would be required for each station.
Finally, a more sophisticated central processor would be
required to handle multiple inputs simultaneously.
On the other hand, a system that can only process
missile types one at a time would likely be simpler in
design, occupy less space and create less need for materials
handling equipment. However, setup and tear down of
equipment would likely affect the production rate and space
would need to be allocated to accommodate the queues of
missiles that would develop.
C. OBSOLESCENCE
It can be expected that as non-allied nations develop
countermeasures to U.S. missile systems, weapons in the
current inventory will either be upgraded or phased out.
Furthermore, in the last decade, semi-conductor technology
has advanced at an astounding rate. This suggests that the
hardware used in the maintenance system should be designed
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so that it can be easily expanded to exploit new technology
without totally redesigning -ne system. The following means
to incorporate flexibility in the system design should be
considered
:
1 . Plug-in Design
Ideally, as additional missile systems are
incorporated into the facility, the test equipment should
already be compatible with the new missile system. For
example, the software that handles the continuity testing
should be capable of adding a new missile system without a
total rewrite. This could be achieved if the software
algorithms maximized the use of subroutines (abstraction) in
their designs. Another possibility, if data is available
early enough in the development of the new missile, is to
have the software containing the new missile system's test
routines already written into the current package.
With regard to hardware, its design should be such
that the addition of components for a new missile test
system can readily be achieved. A simplified example would
be a standardized electronics buss that can accommodate
plugs for ten missile test systems. When the eleventh
system is incorporated, the buss must be replaced. However,
if the buss could accommodate fifteen systems or be




Instead of designing a piece of support equipment to
handle all missiles, flexibility may be realized by
modularizing the support equipment of each missile system.
For example, a test stand might be built to support either
its own missile type or all missile types. With either
configuration, addition of a new missile type would likely
require acquisition of a new test stand unique to that
missile or modification of the "one holds all" stand.
An alternative that may reduce costs would be to
design fittings for each missile type that permit the use of
a generic test stand. Benefits would be that only one type
of test stand need be designed and, if one stand requires
maintenance, a single spare would be interchangeable.
3
.
TDP Procurement for Future Missile Systems
Investment in a complete Technical Data Package for
missile test equipment would facilitate engineering changes
required by future modifications. Though there is a cost
associated with TDPs (as discussed in Chapter III), it is
much smaller compared to reverse engineering or acquisition
of a new system.
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented several factors in the
selection of an omnibus versus unique test bench situation.
Both hardware and software costs were addressed as were the
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options of using old or designing new test systems.
Additionally, flexibility and reliability of the various
components in the system were discussed.
Software costs continue to increase relative to
hardware. This chapter has emphasized this and we have
pointed out to the reader some of the options available to
help minimize software costs without sacrificing performance
and flexibility. Software must be compatible with hardware,
however, or the system will not function.
Obsolescence is a prime problem, especially when
considering digital equipment necessary to conduct many of
the maintenance functions on the Navy's missile inventory.
The decision maker is cautioned not to expend too many
resources on such equipment and its software especially when
that material may become obsolete in a very short time
frame.
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VI. SEPARATE I/D LEVELS VS. COMBINED I/D LEVEL
To help reduce overall costs, one option available to
the decision maker is the possibility of combining two or
more maintenance functions. This choice brings about
several other issues, which are discussed in the following
paragraphs
.
A. WHAT FUNCTIONS TO COMBINE
One way to eliminate the Intermediate level of
maintenance is to integrate all I-level functions into the
Depot level and continue the O-level substantially as it is
1. Omnibus Depot
When considering this all-in-one concept, the
decision maker must determine how far down the Work
Breakdown Structure (WBS) he wants to go. For example, he
might attempt to combine all air launched missile
maintenance at a single facility. Or he could classify
missiles within groups into "families"; that is, missiles
with similar characteristics, such as guidance and control
or seeker type, may be reworked at one site.
2
.
Individual Missile or Missile Group Depot
At the opposite end of the spectrum from an omnibus
(all-in-one) repair facility is an individual facility for
each specific type of missile. And finally, though at a
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greater cost, several depots for each missile type could be
constructed, giving the advantage of reduced probability of
damage from attack, sabotage or accident.
B. HARDWARE/SOFTWARE COSTS
One of the advantages of absorbing the I-level into the
depot level is the reduction in the quantity of test
equipment. If the present configuration for maintaining
missiles is not changed, increases in the number of I and D
level facilities may be necessary to handle the increased
planned inventories. By combining the four I-level and
three depot level facilities that now exist, test equipment
hardware costs could be substantially reduced, depending
upon how much redundancy (and therefore surge capacity) one
wishes to maintain within the system.
However, one should obviously not concentrate strictly
on hardware, but should consider also the software
requirements and costs, as discussed in Chapter V.
C. STANDARDIZATION
An important advantage of a centralized maintenance
facility is the increase in standardization of test
equipment. As the system currently exists, several failures
detected at the I-level cannot be duplicated at the Depot.
One possible reason for this "unable to duplicate the
discrepancy" problem is the variability in tolerances
71
13between various test sets located at different sites.
Even though all test sets are frequently calibrated,
settings can drift during the equipment's service time
causing one set to reject the same data which was obtained
and accepted by another, identical piece of equipment. If
all test benches were under the same roof, then this type of
anomaly could be easily and quickly eliminated by
recalibration . Under the current system, a substantial
amount of time may pass before a calibration problem between
facilities is detected and corrected.
D. PIPELINE DELAYS
One of the major problems encountered by the Navy's air
launched missile maintenance system is the time a missile is
in the rework "pipeline". Reference 27 was a thesis
conducted to help the Navy reduce its maintenance pipeline.
One of the major delays encountered in the pipeline was
caused by transportation problems. With the Harpoon missile
system, the pipeline time has been reduced "by an average of
50 days over a six-month period through January of 1986"
[Ref. 28]. This reduction was achieved through the use of a
dedicated transportation system. This is a costly but
efficient method of providing missile transportation which
incorporates a hard scheduled carrier that makes deliveries
on preset days of the month.
13 This variability can exist for identical as well as
different equipment.
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with a combined facility, the pipeline could be further
reduced by eliminating the need for a transportation system
between the IMA and Depot sites, and by employing a
dedicated transportation system between the offload point
and the repair facility.
E. MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL
Cost savings and reduction of coordination difficulties
can be achieved with a combined facility by eliminating
duplication in management and various support personnel.
Since the combining of I and D level maintenance would
require little extra effort, the management structure at the
Depot level should require only minimal reorganization with
a negligible, if any, increase in personnel.
F. ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES
The decision maker must be aware that significant
organizational differences currently exist between the I and
D level management structures and the different SYSCOMS
.
NAVAIR runs the Depots while NAVSEA is responsible for I
level facilities. Additionally, missile maintenance is a
small part of the NADEP's (Depot level) business, while it
is the whole reason for existence among the Intermediate
facilities. Therefore, each entity tends to assign
different priorities to its missile division.
At the worker level, basic differences exist between the
I and D level of skills exercised by the employees within
73
each organization. The floor-level work in the IMA is very
mechanically oriented, with major functions consisting of
missile disassembly, testing and replacement of WRAs , and
missile reassembly. It does not involve the product at the
component level.
On the other hand, depot level work is highly technical.
This includes testing, analysis and repairing WRAs at the
component level. It is oriented towards the electronics of
the missile and not the mechanics of the weapon.
The skill levels required by each function are quite
different and ability to transfer knowledge from one
function to the next is extremely limited. When considering
these factors, the desired level loading theoretically
achievable from combining I and D level maintenance may not
be accomplished to the extent desired. Missiles will still
come in from the fleet in "batches", causing a "feast or
famine" environment at the I level and personnel who work on
the depot functions would possess limited ability to assist
the I level workers. Even if cross training were possible,
union problems would likely occur when management attempts
to redefine the workers' job descriptions. In particular,
the individual worker would undoubtedly protest if he were
required to perform a higher paying task and yet receive pay
at a lower rate. The decision must be made as to what wage
scale is appropriate for the combined I/D workers, whether
it should be typical of level rates, the more complex I
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level rates, or somewhere in between. This question will
likely be resolved during negotiations with unions (or
perhaps by using non-union employees) before such a combined
facility can be established.
G. WEAPONS STORAGE
Perhaps the biggest hurdle to overcome is the problem of
weapons storage encountered by the NADEPs. Virtually every
government facility has extremely limited or no storage
facilities for the ordnance portion of the missile. One of
the major reasons for creating the I level was the inability
of the NADEPs to handle the warheads and/or fuels contained
within the missile [Ref. 11]. If one is considering
combining these two, then all the political, economic and
environmental ramifications of ordnance handling must be
carefully weighed. With today's climate, the political
problems are paramount, and must be heavily weighed in any
decision.
H. PAPERWORK "COMPATIBILITY"
Information reporting systems will need to be
standardized. New forms must be developed that are
compatible with, and endorsed by, all concerned. The
current problem of incompatibility between NAVAIR and NAVSEA
paperwork will need to be eliminated. Even without further
action in the area of a combined I/D level facility, the
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standardization of paperwork will go a long way toward
improving efficiency and relations between the two commands.
I. MISSILE MAINTENANCE UNITS
If a combined I/D facility is developed, continuation of
the Missile Maintenance Unit (MMU) should be considered.
Although initially regarded as an experiment, MMUl has
proven itself to be a capable repair facility that has the
potential for realizing large cost savings. Even if limited
to the most minimal tasks of inspection and Weapons
Repairable Assembly (WRA) replacement, the savings in
transportation costs alone are substantial. Consider the
cost of transportation from the Philippines to the United
States, then couple that with the delays encountered in even
a dedicated transportation system, and one can easily see
that the MMU has the potential for realizing large savings
in the missile repair pipeline, both in dollars and
inventory and readiness figures.
J. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT
As new technological improvements are made, some of the
work currently performed at the I level could be assumed by
the Organization level. For example. Built In Test
Equipment (BITE) could be expanded to include a "plug-in"
portable unit capable of testing some of the missile's
subsystems. Such a capability at the level could enable
the ship or squadron to increase the Serviceable In Service
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Time (SIST) of the missile, further reducing the need for
the unit to be inducted into the maintenance pipeline.
Again the effect would be lower transportation costs and
higher readiness percentages. Although still undeveloped,
such electronic capabilities are advancing at an ever
increasing rate. Since retrofit costs are high, the
decision maker should seriously consider the use of such
emergent technology when evaluating the alternatives.
K. CONCLUSION
This chapter has concerned itself with the possibility
of combining intermediate and depot level maintenance
functions. Prior to making the decision about which
functions to combine, several factors must be considered.
The major ones were dealt with in this chapter.
Compared with some of the factors dealt with in
preceding chapters, many of the elements discussed here may
seem trivial, and perhaps they may be if considered
individually. However, most of the points mentioned are
interrelated and it is this interrelation that produces a
substantial impact upon the economic and strategic outcome




Before the decision-maker can reasonably compare the
alternatives on a cost basis, he should determine the
minimum requirements of the system. For the most part, this
equates to the average production capacity necessary to meet
the missile repair and inspection demand. This demand is
essentially a function of missile inspection intervals,
mission readiness requirements, unscheduled failures and
inventory size. The following formula is offered to
determine the minimum required system production rate per
missile type:
P = (R X I) + a,
s
where, per missile type,
P = production rate
R = readiness level
I = missile inventory
s = inspection interval ( SIST)
a = the rate of unscheduled returns due to missiles
failing BITE checks, damaged through mishandling,
etc.
Average required turn-around-time can be obtained with
the following formula:
Rtat = ( (1-R) X I) ,
P
where Rtat = average required turn-around-time.
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The above formulas assume that the work is level loaded.
In reality, operational training cycles will produce peaks
and valleys in the demand. Therefore, they should be viewed
primarily as a means to establish a baseline. The decision-
maker will probably wish to configure the system to meet
higher than average demand. Otherwise, if productivity
cannot meet periods of heightened demand, mission readiness
will decrease until production can catch up.
It should be noted that the turn-around-time begins when
the SIST expires or the defective unit is discovered and
ends when the missile is made available to the fleet.
Therefore, logistics and administrative delay time must be
taken into account when the system is configured to meet the
required turn-around-time.
The production effort itself will consist of two basic
functions which are 1) the inspection and return to the
fleet of missiles that require no further maintenance and 2)
the repair of missiles that fail initial inspection or
require refurbishing. Since the missiles that pass
inspection constitute roughly 80% of the production quota,
the effort to design the production capacity can primarily
focus on those missiles that require further maintenance.
In addition to production requirements, there are other
requirements that can affect the cost data such as surge
capacity or the acceptable vulnerability to attack.
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B. INDIVIDUAL COST ELEMENTS
Once minimum requirements have been defined and the
decision maker has compiled the attributes of the system
alternatives, he must then determine their costs for
comparison. These costs can be grouped into four basic
categories. [Ref. 29: pp. 416-470]
The first category is composed of direct costs and are
generally straightforward. An example would be the
procurement cost of a standard piece of equipment. The
second category, indirect costs, are somewhat less obvious
but can still be determined for accounting purposes.
Administrative costs would fall under this category. Many
of the costs for the missile maintenance system can be
categorized as indeterminate. For example, undeveloped
technology and obsolescence will eventually have definite
costs but cannot be determined at the time of system
acquisition. Finally, intangible costs, such as surge
capability and strategic vulnerability, that defy
quantification, are an essential part of the problem.
1 . Direct Costs
The following elements of the missile maintenance
facility are considered direct costs and can be included




a. Land and buildings.
b. Alterations to present facilities.
c. Transportation rates.
d. Utilities.
e. Non-developmental hardware and supplies.




Other elements of the missile maintenance facility
can be quantified but are not available in the form of price
lists, rate schedules or regional wage indexes. These costs
include
:
a. Corporate office overhead.
b. Contract costs.
c. Technical data packages.
d. Services from support activities.
3 Indeterminate Costs
Relative to direct and indirect costs, indeterminate
costs are much more difficult to obtain and must be
estimated. These costs will introduce the greatest amount
of uncertainty into the optimization problem because they
will eventually materialize as actual, measurable dollar
amounts but cannot be accurately determined until they have
occurred.
The following elements are the most obvious





c. Cost overruns from time delays.






4 . Intangible Costs
Intangible costs do not lend themselves to
quantification. However, each choice will influence the
degree to which these costs occur and they can be compared
between choices.
The following would be included in this category:
a. Flexibility of management.
b. Vulnerability to attack.
c. Social climate and work ethic.
C. CONCLUSION
The degree to which the decision maker effectively
arrives at an optimal choice will be greatly influenced by
his ability to determine accurate cost data. Some elements
are fairly straightforward. Off-the-shelf equipment and
real estate costs can be determined through consumer price
lists or inquiry. Other costs, such as procurement of
undeveloped, high technology test equipment must be
estimated and can contribute significantly to the life-
cycle-cost. Finally, costs such as obsolescence will only
be "best guesses" derived through expert opinion.
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The decision maker must also decide when he has
collected enough data. It is possible to spend time and
money ferreting out costs that are immaterial. Sensitivity
analysis should be used throughout the collection process to
indicate a reasonable level of research.
It has been estimated that 60% of a system's life-cycle
costs are determined during early program planning and
conceptual design [Ref. 18: p. 66]. For the relatively
small amount of resource required for cost analysis,
significant savings can be realized throughout the life of
the maintenance facility.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis has addressed the five primary issues of
ownership, management, number of repair sites, test
equipment configuration and maintenance organizational
structure of a prospective air launched missile maintenance
program for the U. S. Navy. It is assumed that when the
Request For Proposal is issued, the level of detail will be
much more complete than that presented in this thesis.
However, we have attempted to deliver a conceptual road map
for comparison of available alternatives.
If the reader is to gain any appreciation for the nature
of the missile maintenance facility, it is imperative that
he view it as a system. Just as the airframe, powerplant
and avionics of an aircraft require careful design and
integration, so must the "components" of the missile
maintenance system. The configuration of each of the five
basic sub-units discussed in this thesis will have a
profound effect upon the make-up of the other four.
Obviously, constraints on the system will determine much
of its structure. Fiscal limits must be observed and,
though less defined, political elements cannot be ignored.
Revision of existing organizational control, such as the
NAVSEA/I-level and NAVAIR/D-level cognizance, would entail
significant change.
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Calculating an optimal solution within the constraints
is itself a major undertaking. An appropriate range for the
variables should be defined and significant cost elements
must be segregated from trivia. Risks associated with new
technology must be weighed against known variables having
less potential. Finally, strategic values must somehow be
matched with dollar thresholds.
Input data values should be as accurate as possible.
Bearing in mind the systemic nature of the problem, missing
or poorly derived estimates of any number of variables can
completely change the outcome.
A significant number of the issues addressed in this
thesis entail indeterminate costs. Numerous statistical
methods for indeterminate cost estimation have been
developed, such as parametric analysis and the delphi
technique. Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses
and it is suggested that the reader refer to Risk Assessment
Techniques, A Handbook for Program Management Personnel
,
Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
for further information.
Another excellent source for detailed guidance in
conducting cost comparisons is DoD Instruction 4100. 33-H,
POD In-House Vs. Contract Commercial and Industrial
Activities Cost Comparison Handbook . This document
addresses aspects such as those listed above and provides a
step by step outline for the comparison process.
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Some significant variables simply cannot be determined.
A drastic jump in fuel prices similar to that experienced in
the early 1970s would impact transportation costs and skew
the decision factor for geographic locations and
transportation modes. Future appropriations by Congress can
vary considerably from one administration to the next,
affecting the acquisition strategy of hardware and real
property. Countermeasures developed by adversarial nations
which render current weapons systems obsolete become
increasingly possible as their technology advances. These
unknowns leave the decision maker little choice but to
satisfice. —
Though beyond the scope of this thesis, one issue that
bears mention is how well the current missile maintenance
policy would satisfy the needs of the fleet with the funding
that would be used for an omnibus facility. Whether
actively or by default, the decision will ultimately be made
to either proceed or not proceed with a missile maintenance
program that is fundamentally different from the one now
existing. It is strongly recommended that, as a minimum,
the issues compiled in this thesis be thoroughly examined
before a final course is set.
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